Folkemord, ateisme, modernitet etc.
Kommentar #27Innleiing
Eg fekk lyst til å kommentere denne debatten om folkemord og ateisme. Fyrst vil eg likevel utfordre Lars. Du skreiv: "Overgrep begått både i kristendommens navn (altså som det er mobilisert til på kristent grunnlag) og av folk som regner seg som kristne, er styggelig lang." Sidan vi no helst snakkar om overgrep i tungvektarklassa, skulle eg gjerne sett at du konkretiserte kva slike store overgrep som er vorte "mobilisert til på kristent grunnlag".
Alister McGrath om religion, ateisme og vald
Så ynskjer eg å sitere litt relevante utdrag. Det fyrste utdraget er frå boka "The Dawkins Delusion" av Oxford-professor Alister McGrath. I denne boka er det eit kapittel med tittelen "Is religion evil?" Eg tippar at Gule er relativt samd i McGraths refleksjonar nedanfor.
"Dawkins is, I think, entirely right when he exposes and challenges religious violence. I am with him totally, and hope that the force of his point here will not be obscured by the ludicrous inaccuracy of much of the remainder of The God delusion. It is clear that his ire is directed primarily against Islamist fundamentalism, particularly its jihadist forms. All of us need to work to rid the world of the baleful influence of religious violence. On that point, Dawkins and I are agreed.
Yet is this a necessary feature of religion? Here, I must insist that we abandon the outmoded idea that all religions say more or less the same things. They clearly do not. I write as a Christian, who holds that the face, will and character of God are fully disclosed in Jesus of Nazareth. And as Dawkins knows, Jesus of Nazareth did no violence to anyone. He was the object, not the agent, of violence. Instead of meeting violence with violence, rage with rage, Christians are asked to 'turn the other cheek', and 'not to let the sun go down on their anger'. This is about the elimination of the roots of violence - no, more than that: it is about its transfiguration.
McGrath held fram med å skildre tragedien i Amish-sekta i oktober 2006, då ein mann ville hevne seg på dei, noko han gjorde ved å trenge inn i ei skuleklasse og skyte og drepe fem unge jenter. Men det sørgjande Amish-samfunnet gjekk tydeleg ut og sa at dei ynskte å tilgje, og at dei ikkje ville ta hemn. (Les meir her). McGrath held fram:
"As someone who grew up in Northern Ireland, I know about religious violence only too well. There is no doubt that religion can generate violence. But it's not alone in this. The history of the twentieth century has given us a frightening awareness of how political extremism can equally cause violence. In Latin America, millions of people seem to have 'disappeared' as a result of ruthless campaigns of violence by right-wing politicians and their militias. In Cambodia, Pol Pot eliminated his millions in the name of socialism.
The rise of the Soviet Union was of particular significance. Lenin regarded the elimination of religion as central to the socialist revolution, and put in place measures designed to eradicate religious beliefs through the 'protracted use of violence'. One of the greatest tragedies of this dark era in human history was that those who sought to eliminate religious belief through violence and oppression believed they were justified in doing so. They were accountable to no higher authority than the state.
In one of his more bizarre creedal statemes as an atheist, Dawkins insists that there is 'not the smallest evidence' that atheism systematically influences people to do bad things. It's an astonishing, naïve and somewhat sad statement. Dawkins is clearly an ivory-tower atheist, disconnected from the real and brutal world of the twentieth century. The facts are otherwise. In their efforts to enforce atheist ideology, the Soviet authorities systematically destroyed and eliminated the ast majority of churches and priests during the period 1918-1941. The statistics make for dreadful reading. This violence and repression was undertaken in pursuit of an atheist agenda - the elimination of religion.
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Dawkins' childishly naïve view that atheists would never carry out crimes in the name of atheism simply founders on the cruel rocks of reality(...)Dawkins is simply in denial about the darker side of atheism, making him a less than credible critic of religion. He has a fervent, unquestioning faith in the universal goodness of atheism which he refuses to subject to critical examination. Yes, there is much that is wrong with contemporary religion and much that needs to be reformed. Yet the same is also true of atheism, which needs to subject itself to the self-searching intellectual and moral criticisms that religious systems are willing to direct against themselves.
The reality of the situation is that human beings are capable of both violence and moral excellence - and that both of these may be provoked by world views, whether religious or otherwise."
Er sekulære livssyn 'av natur' i fare for å skape farlege ideologiar?
Dette siste sitatet er i sak det same som Gule også har gjeve uttrykk for i denne tråden. Men inntil Gule presenterer sine prov (jfr. ovanfor), trur eg trygt vi kan seie at det er livssyn knytt til ateistisk sekularisme som - med eller utan teknologi - har produsert dei mest livsfarlege og dødelege samfunna og styreformene verda har sett. Trass alt er det vanskeleg, trur eg, å finne døme på at eksplisitte kristne ideologiar med bakgrunn i Jesu bod el. l. har produsert noko slikt som masseutryddingsleirar, Gulagar, tvungne hungersnaudar a la Stalin, folkemord a la Pol Pot, kulturrevolusjon a la Mao. Men i alle desse nett nemnte tilfella har ateistisk sekularisme spela ei instrumentell og avgjerande rolle i utforminga av ideologiane som skapte desse fenomena.
Og i det fylgjande vil argumentere for at dette heller ikkje er tilfeldig. Eg meiner ein kan presentere argument som viser at ateistisk sekularisme så å seie "av natur" er eit livssyn som i langt større grad enn kristendomen står i fare for å gje opphav til ultravaldelege ideologiar. Det er ein sterk påstand, men eg vil freiste å argumentere for han i det fylgjande, også her særleg med utgangspunkt i David Bentley Harts "Atheist Delusions". Kvar får lese og sjølv vurdere den argumentasjonen han presenterer. Men fyrst nokre ord om kva Det nye testamente seier.
Dei sentrale formaningene i Det nye testamente
Som vist ovanfor peikar McGrath mot nokre grunnleggjande sider ved den kristne bodskapen. Dette er ope til å lese i NT for einkvar som vil. Her er nokre av dei grunnleggjande formaningane Jesus og apostlane gjev i NT: Elsk dine fiendar. Tilgje den som gjer deg urett. Ikkje ta hemn. Velsign dei som forbannar deg. Gje vatn til dei tyrste. Kle den nakne. Besøk dei som er i fengsel. Bær den andres byrder. Heidre kvarandre. Ikkje kall nokon for "idiot". Ver milde. Lat godleiken dykkar kome til syne for alle menneske. Gjer godt mot alle. Ver som ein samaritan som tek seg av den lidande som du aldri før har møtt, og som tilhøyrer ei anna folkegruppe enn deg. Elsk din neste. Gje til den som bed deg. Lån bort utan å vente attende. Ikkje bli sint på bror din. Ikkje gjer urett mot nokon. Det er sælare å gje enn å få. Når ein fattig kjem inn i kyrkjelyden, må han setjast likt med den rike.
Slik kunne vi halde på og ramsa opp mange fleire formaningar av den same typen. Desse formaningane spring ut av ei grunnleggjande trusoppfatning: Gud er kjærleik, og den kallar seg hans barn, må reflektere denne kjærleiken (dette er til dømes logikken i bergpreika). Poenget er at mennesket er skapt i Guds bilete. Difor er det uendeleg verdifullt. Gudsbiletet kan ikkje gå tapt sjølv om det kan bli øydelagt av eit menneskes forkasting av Gud. Men gudsbiletet inneber altså også eit ansvar om å reflektere Guds eige vesen; derav det doble kjærleiksbodet. NT er vidare tydeleg på at hemn må overlatast til Gud, som ein gong skal døme rettferdig. I den noverande tidsalderen, inntil Guds rike bryt inn, må kristne leggje vinn på å tilgje.
Alt dette representerer meir eller mindre faste formaningar som er i hjartet av det kristne livssynet. Og i den grad kristendomen får gjennomsyre eit samfunn eller eit liv - vel - så er det desse skriftene, NT, som er ressursen. Og der står altså slike formaningar. Men i den grad ateisme får gjennomsyre eit samfunn og eit liv så er det andre ressursar som vil spele ei rolle, nemleg... Ja, nemleg kva? Kvar hentar ein ateist sine etiske oppfatningar frå? Her skal eg sleppe til orde Hart:
DB Hart om kva det vil seie å vere 'moderne'
"I shall venture an even more presumptuous, and intentionally provocative, assertion:To be entirely modern (which very few of us are) is to believe in exactly nothing. This is not to say it is to have no beliefs: the truly modern person may believe in almost anything, or even perhaps everything, so long as all these beliefs rest securely upon a more fundamental and radical faith in the nothing - or, better, in nothingness as such. Modernity's highest ideal - its special understanding of personal autonomy - requires us to place our trust in an original absence underlying all of reality, a fertile void in which all things are possible, from which arises no impediment to our wills, and before which we may consequently choose to make ourselves what we choose. We trust, that is to say, that there is no substantial criterion by which to judge our choices that stands higher than the unquestioned good of free choice itself, and that therefore all judgment, divine no less than human, is in some sense an infringement upon our freedom. This is our primal ideology. In the most unadorned terms possible, the ethos of modernity is - to be perfectly precise - nihilism.
This word is not, I want immediately to urge, a term of abuse, and I do not employ it dismissively or contemptuously. There are today a number of quite morally earnest philosophers (especially in continental Europe) who are perfectly content to identify themselves as nihilists, because they understand nihilism to be no more than the rejection of any idea of an ultimate source of truth transcendent of the self or of the world - a rejection, that is, not of the various objective truths that can be identified within the world but of the notion that there is some total or eternal Truth beyond the world, governing reality and defining the good, the true, or the beautiful for all of us here below.
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Now this is, as I have said, a willfully extreme formulation of the matter, and life is rarely lived at the extremes. For most of us, the forces of conformity that surround and seduce us - political, religious, patriotic, and popular - are necessary shelters against the storm of infinite possibility. A perfectly consistent ethic of choice would ultimately erase any meaningful distinction between good and evil, compassion and cruelty, love and hatred, reverence and transgression, and few of us could bear to inhabit the world on those terms...Even when we have shed the moral and religious precepts of our ancestors, most of us try to be ethical and even, in many cases, 'spiritual'. It is rare, however, that we are able to impose anything like a coherent pattern upon the somewhat haphazard collection of principles and practices by which we do this. Our ethics, especially, tends to be something of a continuous improvisation or brickolage: we assemble fragments of traditions we half remember, gather ethical maxims almost at random from the surrounding culture, attempt to find and inner equlibrium between tolerance and conviction, and so on, until we have knit together something like a code, suited to our needs, temperaments, capacities, and imaginations. We select the standards of values we find appealing from a larger market of moral options and then try to arrange them into some sort of tasteful harmony.
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Harts skildring av vår tids sekulære moralfilosofi understøttast til dømes av Alasdair Macintyres "After virtue" eller også av Richard Normans "Humanisme" (dersom nokon skulle vere interessert i at eg siterer relevante avsnitt frå sistnemnte bok, så sei ifrå). Poenget til Hart er altså at - særleg etter Nietzsche - har det blitt klart at fornufta som eintydig og allmennmenneskeleg premissleverandør for moralen, har brote saman. Openberring som kjelde for moralen har vorte forkasta for lenge sidan. Heller ikkje menneskenaturen kan bidra med tydelege retningsliner for moralen (sjølv om til dømes Norman har nokre - så vidt eg kan bedømme noko mangelfulle - argument i denne retningen). Det som vert sett fram som det avgjerande, normative punkt, er eins eigen vilje. Men denne viljen er sin eigen og øvste autoritet, og kan dermed prinsipielt sett trekkast i mange ulike retningar. Derav Harts påstand om at modernitetens fullkomenheit er trua på "ingenting". Hart utdjupar dette meir her, for den som skulle vere interessert.
Dette betyr absolutt ikkje at alle som vedkjenner seg til det moderne og til sekulær humanisme nødvendigvis er umoralske menneske. Mange har høge ideal og utfører mange gode handlingar mot sine medmenneske. Det kan gjerne bli sagt klart og tydeleg, poenget mitt er ikkje å bestride dette. Dei fleste sekulære humanistar vil også høgt og tydeleg forsvare menneskerettane og den gylne regelen. Det er imidlertid vanskeleg å sjå korleis desse ideala og handlingane kan gjevast ei koherent og logisk grunngjeving innanfor livssynet deira, og dette er nettopp poenget. Dersom ein fyrst vedkjenner seg til at "min eigen vilje" er den øvste autoriteten (slik til dømes Norman gjer i boka "Humanisme"), har ein, anten ein vil eller ikkje, opna opp for det meste:
Vil sekulær fornuft leie oss inn i gullalderen - eller inn i nye kriser?
"Can one really believe - as the New Atheists seem to do - that secular reason, if finally allowed to move forward, free of the constraining hand of archaic faith, will naturally make society more just, more humane, and more rational that it has been in the past? What evidence supports such an expectation? It is rather difficult, placing everything in the scales, to vest a great deal of hope in modernity, however radiantly enchanting its promises, when one considers how many innocent lives have already been swallowed up in the flames of modern 'progress'. At the end of the twentieth century - the century when secularization became an explicit political and cultural project throughout the world - the forces of progressive ideology could boast an unprecedentedly vast collection of corpses, but not much in way of new moral concepts. At least, not anyone we should be especially proud of. The best ideals to which we moderns continue to cling along antedate modernity; for the most part, all we can claim as truly, distinctively our own are atrocities.
One could, I suppose, argue that the secular project had somehow been diverted from its proper course at the dawn of the twentieth century, just as the new ideologies were assuming concrete political forms, or had been stalled or subverted by certain instransigent forces of unreason. This would be a more credible claim, however, if the twentieth century's horrors were demonstrably aberrations within the larger story of the modern world. But, in fact, the process of secularization was marked, from the first, by the magnificent limitlessness of violence. One does not have to harbor any nostalgia for the old political order of Christendom, or for the church's degrading association with the state, to be conscious of secularity's cost.
As I noted in my remarks upon the early modern period's 'wars of religion', when one looks back upon the historical sequels of the settlement of Westphalia, it is hard not to conclude that the chief inner dynamism of secularization has always been the modern state's great struggle to free itself from those institutional, moral and sacramental allegiances that still held it even partially in check, so that it could now get on with all those mighty tasks - nationalist wars, colonial empires, universal conscription, mass extermination of civilians, and so on - that would constitute its special contribution to the human experience. The old order could generally reckon its victims only in the thousands. But in the new age, the secular state, with all its hitherto unimagined capacities, could pursue its purely earthly ideals and ambitions only if it enjoyed the liberty to kill by the millions. How else could it spread its wings?
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For the purposes of my argument, it is enough simply to ask where the ascendancy of our modern notion of freedom as pure spontaneity of the will leads the culture it pervades(...) As a matter purely of logic, absolute spontaneity is an illusion; all acts of the will are acts toward some real or imagined end, which prompts volition into motion. But something dangerously novel entered our culture when we began to believe that the proper end of the will might simply be willing as such. Nor does the truly liberated will have to confine its energies to the adventure of the self's discovery and invention of itself; collective will is ever so much more exhilaratingly potent than individual will, at least if it can be disciplined and marshaled for some 'greater' purpose, and the material upon which it can exercise its plastic powers is ever so much more immense than the paltry canvas of a private psychology. Moreover, it there really is no transcendent source of the good to which the will is naturally drawn, but only the power of the will to decide what ends it desires - by which to create and determine itself for itself - the no human project can be said to be inherently irrational, or (for that matter) inherently abominable. If freedom of the will is our supreme value, after all, then is is for all intents and purposes our god. And certain kinds of god (as our pagan forebears understood) expect to be fed.