Tuesday, June 18, 2013

Edward Feser om Plantingas og Morelands teisme

Kan lesast HER.

Dette er veldig viktig stoff! Kvifor? Jo, fordi det set fingeren på avgjerande forskjellar mellom to tradisjonars måte å tenke religionsfilosofi på, anten den evangelikale/protestantiske, eller den klassisk-katolske. Les det fylgjande:

There are, Plantinga and Moreland seem to be arguing, several phenomena which might at least in principle be given a non-theistic explanation but for which theism is in fact a better explanation. And “theism” is understood as a hypothesis postulating an unobservable theoretical entity which instantiates such properties as the property of being a person, the property of being alive, the property of being conscious, etc. But it instantiates them in a way that is different from the way that natural things do, making it a member of the class of “supernatural beings.” But it is not just any old member of this class, but the “premier” member. The way this is supposed to explain the evidence in question is as follows. Since God, like us, instantiates properties like being alive and being conscious, he could plausibly be what imparted those properties to us if he had the intention of doing so. That he did have such intentions is something Christian revelation and the like tells us. And so on.

 Now I am not certain that Plantinga and Moreland would accept this summary without qualification. Perhaps there are aspects of it that they would rephrase. And obviously they would add a great deal in the way of argumentation for theism so construed. But as I say, this is what strikes me as a natural reading, and how I think it would strike the typical atheist reader. And with all due respect to Plantinga and Moreland, I have to say that if this is what I thought theism and the “case” for theism really amounted to, I wouldn’t find theism any more philosophically interesting or challenging than Nagel and his critics do. (Indeed, it pretty much is what I thought theism amounted to in my atheist days.)

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